![]() This covers Aristotle's book on propositions, De interpretatione. The second operation, namely the combination of simple concepts into propositions, is handled in Part II. This covers Porphry's theory of the predicables, and the Aristotle's categories. The first operation, namely the understanding of simple concepts, signified by terms, is dealt with in Part I. It is in three parts, corresponding to the three Aristotelian 'operations of the understanding'. Like all logical works of the medieval period, the Summa is organised into headings that correspond, for the most part, with the books of Aristotle's logical works known as the Organon, or their derivatives. It is sometimes expressed by the maxim that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity (the so-called Ockham's Razor), but Ockham never used this formulation. This principle - nominalism in the strictest sense - has a wide range of theological and well as philosophical consequences, as Ockham suggests in his introduction. The second is that the root of such logico-linguistic errors is the tendency to multiply entities in accordance with the multiplicity of names, and that not everything that appears to be a name has an entity corresponding to it. ![]() In his preface to the work, Ockham says the book is to help young students in theology and other faculties from being overcome by such difficulties, "falling into many errors by ignoring valid argument as though it were sophistry, and mistaking sophistry for valid argument". The first is that theological and philosophical difficulties are caused by ignorance of logic, by which he means Aristotelian logic, rather than mathematical logic. His underlying purpose is to promote some radical ideas about language and logic. But Ockham's objective was more than writing a textbook. Ockham presents the book as a manual or textbook, and its organisation and framework is similar to other such medieval textbooks. The Latin word Summa is difficult to translate, and does not mean a mere summary of its subject, but rather a comprehensive handbook, or manual or compendium, intended to cover all the salient points of the subject, written authoritatively, and from a single point of view. This idea had a far-reaching influence in Western thought, and is regarded by some as the beginning of European empiricism, by others as an anticipation of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. It is introduced by Ockham as a manual or textbook of logic, but he has the more ambitious purpose of promoting a philosophical programme, according to which philosophical and theological error can be resolved by a correct understanding of logic and language. It was probably begun at the Franciscan friary at Greyfriars, London, and may have been finished while Ockham was in Avignon where he had been summoned by Pope John XXII to answer charges of heresy. Like all scholarly works of that period, it was written in Latin. Nearly a thousand pages long, it is organised in three parts according to Aristotle's three functions of the understanding, namely concepts and the terms which signify them (Part I), propositions formed by combining terms together (Part II), and argumentation (Part III). The sec- ond path is explored here as a modest attempt to show that once we abandon the bias against the history of logic as irrelevant, we can ac- tually get access to firm logical solutions inaccessible from a classical perspective, while still practicing logic proper.The Summa of Logic (Latin Summa Logicae) is an important work by the English philosopher-theologian and logician William of Ockham, written some time between 13. One can modify classical logic and adapt the formal apparatus to account for the aforementioned problems (Graham Priest’s logic for intentional- ity serves as an example of such an approach in this work) or one can make an even more radical shift and seek for inspiration in a different logical tradition like the terminist logic developed in the Late Middle Ages by figures like William of Ockham or John Buridan. Since intentionality plays an important role in our everyday reasoning, a proper formal account of it is highly desirable, yet it requires a departure from classical logic. This MSc thesis addresses three challenges posed by intentionality - the ability of our mental states and language to be about something - to a logician: an apparent reference to non-existent objects, intentional indeterminacy and the failure of substitutivity of coextensive terms in an intentional context. ![]()
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